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INDEX CALCULUS IN THE TRACE ZERO VARIETY
ELISA GORLA AND MAIKE MASSIERER
Abstract. We discuss how to apply Gaudry’s index calculus algorithm for abelian varieties
to solve the discrete logarithm problem in the trace zero variety of an elliptic curve. We treat
in particular the practically relevant cases of field extensions of degree 3 or 5. Our theoretical
analysis is compared to other algorithms present in the literature, and is complemented by
results from a prototype implementation.
1. Introduction
Given an elliptic curve E defined over a finite field Fq, consider the group E(Fqn) of rational
points over a field extension of prime degree n. Since E is defined over Fq, the group E(Fqn)
contains the subgroup E(Fq) of Fq-rational points of E. Moreover, it contains the subgroup Tn of
points P ∈ E(Fqn) whose trace P + ϕ(P ) + . . .+ϕn−1(P ) is zero, where ϕ denotes the Frobenius
homomorphism on E. The group Tn is called the trace zero subgroup of E(Fqn), and it is the
group of Fq-rational points of the trace zero variety relative to the field extension Fqn |Fq.
In this paper, we study the hardness of the DLP in the trace zero variety. Our interest in
this question has several motivations. First of all, supersingular trace zero varieties can achieve
higher security per bit than supersingular elliptic curves, as shown by Rubin and Silverberg
in [RS02, RS09] and by Avanzi and Cesena in [AC07, Ces10]. Ideally, in pairing-based proto-
cols the embedding degree k is such that the DLP in Tn and in F
∗
qkn have the same complexity.
In order to achieve this, an accurate assessment of the complexity of the DLP in Tn is necessary.
Moreover, since Tn is isomorphic to E(Fqn)/E(Fq), the DLP in E(Fqn) has the same complexity
as the DLP in Tn. This provides another motivation to study the hardness of the DLP in Tn.
A further motivation comes from the fact that the trace zero subgroup itself can be used within
asymmetric cryptographic protocols using the DLP as a primitive, as proposed by Frey in [Fre98].
Using trace zero varieties in cryptographic protocols presents some advantages with respect to
elliptic curves. In fact, a clever use of the Frobenius endomorphism allows us to compute the
group operation more efficiently than for an elliptic curve of about the same cardinality, leading
to more efficient scalar multiplication in the group (see [Fre99, Lan01, Lan04, AC07] or [ACD+06,
Section 15.3.2]). This technique is analogous to the one for Koblitz curves [Kob91] and was later
applied to GLV–GLS curves [GLV01, GLS11]. Another advantage is that for groups of crypto-
graphically relevant size, the order of the group can simply be calculated using the characteristic
polynomial of the Frobenius endomorphism. This allows for more efficient computation of the
group order in comparison to the group of rational points of an elliptic curve over a prime field of
comparable size (see [ACD+06, Section 15.3.1]). Finally, in the recent papers [GM14] and [GM13]
we proposed new efficient representations for the elements of Tn, for any n. More precisely,
we can represent the elements of the group with (n − 1) log2 q + 1 bits, which is optimal since
|Tn| ∼ qn−1. We refer the interested reader to [Gor11] for a discussion of the relevance of efficient
representations.
In this paper, we discuss how to apply Gaudry’s index calculus algorithm for abelian varieties
to solve the discrete logarithm problem in Tn. Gaudry’s algorithm first appeared in [Gau09], and
proposes a general framework to do index calculus on a general abelian variety. A main difficulty
of running an index calculus attack on an abelian variety is producing the relations. When the
abelian variety is an elliptic curve, Gaudry proposes to use Semaev polynomials ([Sem04]) to build
a system of polynomial equations, such that a solution to the system corresponds to a relation.
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The systems can be solved by Gro¨bner bases methods. The complexity of this attack depends on
the size of Fq and the dimension of the abelian variety: Asymptotically in q, and regarding n as a
constant, it has complexity O˜(q2−2/(n−1)), which is lower than that of generic attacks on Tn and on
E(Fqn) for n ≥ 5. This leads to the lowest-complexity attack on the DLP in E(Fqn) for prime n.
Other attacks, of comparable or lower complexity but which only apply to specific elliptic curves,
are discussed in [GHS02, Die03, Die06, DK13, DS]. We apply Gaudry’s index calculus algorithm
to Tn, and demonstrate that it is feasible for n = 3 and q up to about 30 bits. For n = 5 we
show that the bottleneck of the algorithm is the Gro¨bner basis computation. Using some tricks
from [BFP08, JV12] we are able to produce relations and to solve a DLP for very small q, but
the attack this yields is not feasible over fields of cryptographic size, therefore it is presently not
a threat to the DLP in T5 or E(Fq5 ).
We also analyze the algorithm asymptotically in n and q, and we see that the complexity is
exponential in n. This is mostly due to the fact that in order to produce relations, the algorithm
solves polynomial systems whose size (number of equations, number of indeterminates, degrees
of the equations) depends on n, and that the Gro¨bner basis methods have a large complexity in
these parameters. We conclude that one can only hope to produce relations with this method for
small values of n.
The paper is organized as follows. We recall the functionality of index calculus algorithms
and the most important definitions in connection with the trace zero variety in Section 2. Then
we describe the application of Gaudry’s algorithm to the trace zero variety in Section 3, and
we analyze its complexity in Section 4. In Section 5, we present explicit equations and Magma
experiments for n = 3, 5. Finally, we compare the index calculus attack with other attacks on the
DLP in Tn in Section 6, and discuss the implications of our results for trace zero elliptic curve
cryptosystems in Section 7.
Acknowledgements. We thank Pierrick Gaudry, Peter Schwabe, Vanessa Vitse, and Bo-Yin Yang
for useful discussions on the material of this paper. We are grateful to the mathematics department
of the University of Zu¨rich for access to their computing facilities. The authors were supported
by the Swiss National Science Foundation under grant no. 123393.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Index calculus. The security of several public key cryptosystems, including ElGamal and
DSA, is based on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem.
Definition 2.1. Let G be a finite additive group. Given two elements P ∈ G and Q ∈ 〈P 〉, the
discrete logarithm problem (DLP) is
find an element ℓ ∈ Z/(ordP )Z such that ℓP = Q.
The number ℓ is called the discrete logarithm of Q in base P , and denoted by logP Q.
A combination of the Pollard–Rho Algorithm and the Pohlig–Hellman Algorithm can solve an
instance of the DLP in any group G of known order |G| in time O˜(√p), where p is the largest
prime factor of |G|.
However, when a concrete group is given, its properties can often be exploited in order to devise
more efficient attacks. A particularly powerful such class of attacks are index calculus algorithms,
which exploit the algebraic structure of the groups that they work in. There are index calculus
algorithms that compute the DLP in multiplicative groups of finite fields (namely the number field
sieve for prime fields [Adl79, Gor93, JL03] and the function field sieve for fields of small to medium
characteristic [Cop84, Adl94, ADH94, Sch02, JL02, JL06, Jou13a, GGMZ13a, Jou13b, GGMZ13b,
BBD+14, BGJT13]), elliptic curves over extension fields [Sem04, Gau09, Die11, Die13], Picard
groups of hyperelliptic curves and more generally Ca,b curves [ADH94, Gau00, Eng02, Die06,
DT08, EG07, Eng08, EGT11, VJS14], and even general abelian varieties [Gau09].
The general outline of an index calculus attack is as follows (see e.g. [EG02]). Let us assume
that the goal is to compute a discrete logarithm ℓ = logP Q of an element Q ∈ 〈P 〉 in some group
G. Since we are only working in the cyclic subgroup, we may assume that G = 〈P 〉.
1. Factor base: Choose a factor base F = {P1, . . . , Pk} ⊆ 〈P 〉.
INDEX CALCULUS IN THE TRACE ZERO VARIETY 3
2. Relation collection: Construct relations of the form αjP + βjQ =
∑k
i=1mijPi for j =
1, . . . , r > k.
3. Linear algebra: Given the matrixM = (mij) ∈ (Z/ ord(P )Z)k×r , compute a non-zero column
vector γ = (γ1, . . . , γr)
⊺ in the right kernel of M .
4. Individual logarithm: Output ℓ = −(∑rj=1 αjγj)(∑rj=1 βjγj)−1 if ∑βjγj is invertible in
Z/ ord(P )Z, otherwise return to step 2.
It is easy to see that this gives the correct result: Since γ is in the right kernel of M , we have
Mγ = 0, or equivalently
r∑
j=1
mijγj = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , k.
Multiplying all relations from step 2 by γj , summing over j, and using the above equality gives
r∑
j=1
αjγjP +
r∑
j=1
βjγjQ =
r∑
j=1
k∑
i=1
mijγjPi =
k∑
i=1

 r∑
j=1
mijγj

Pi = 0.
Therefore,
Q = −

 r∑
j=1
αjγj



 r∑
j=1
βjγj


−1
P = ℓP.
Algorithms that function in this way have been used for many years to compute discrete loga-
rithms in groups where a concept of factorization is available. However, it was not until 2009 that
Gaudry [Gau09] published an algorithm that works in abelian varieties of dimension at least 2.
His idea is to translate the condition for a relation into a system of polynomial equations and to
solve the system with Gro¨bner basis methods in order to obtain relations. We give more details
on his approach in Section 3, where we apply it to the trace zero variety. The heuristic complexity
of his attack is O˜(q2−2/d) asymptotically for q → ∞, where the dimension d ≥ 2 and all other
parameters associated to the variety (like the degrees of the defining equations and the size of the
representation) are assumed to be constant or bounded by constants.
Since its publication, Gaudry’s algorithm has been applied mostly to the Weil restriction of
elliptic curves defined over extension fields. In fact, Gaudry suggests this application himself in
his original article [Gau09]. A similar algorithm for elliptic curves was developed independently
by Diem [Die11]. The algorithm of Gaudry and Diem was implemented by Joux and Vitse [JV12].
With several further improvements and variations, including a specialized implementation of the
Gro¨bner basis algorithm F4 [JV11] using an idea of Traverso [Tra88], they were able to solve an
instance of an oracle-assisted static Diffie–Hellman problem in E(F2155), which is related to, but
easier than, the DLP in the same group [GJV10]. Fauge`re, Perret, Petit, and Renault [FPPR12],
Petit and Quisquater [PQ12], and Shantz and Teske [ST13] studied the polynomial systems that
arise during this attack. They come to the conclusion that these systems are of a special shape
and that special-purpose Gro¨bner basis techniques may lead to a significant speed-up. The appli-
cation of the algorithm to Edwards curves was studied by Fauge`re, Gaudry, Huot, and Renault in
[FGHR12, FGHR13].
Notice that this approach only threatens elliptic curves defined over extension fields and does
not affect groups E(Fp) where p is a prime. The best attack on such groups is the Pollard–Rho
attack, and the current record for computing a discrete logarithm in E(Fp), for p a 112-bit prime,
is held by Bos, Kaihara, Kleinjung, Lenstra, and Montgomery [BKK+09], using a parallelized
version of the Pollard–Rho Algorithm. Some improvements which take into account the use of the
negation map in running the Pollard–Rho Algorithm are discussed in [BLS11].
Besides elliptic curves, Gaudry’s algorithm for abelian varieties has been applied to the Weil
restriction of hyperelliptic curves of small genus by Nagao [Nag10] and to algebraic tori by Granger
and Vercauteren [GV05]. In this paper, we apply Gaudry’s attack to the trace zero variety.
2.2. The Trace Zero Variety. Throughout this paper, let E be a smooth elliptic curve defined
over a finite field Fq by an affine Weierstraß equation. For any extension field F of Fq, the F-
rational points E(F) on E form a group with neutral element O, the point at infinity. When
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F = Fqn , n ≥ 1, is a finite extension, E(Fqn) is a finite group of order about qn. We denote by +
the group operation and by ϕ the Frobenius endomorphism on E
ϕ : E → E, (X,Y ) 7→ (Xq, Y q), O 7→ O.
Throughout the paper, we denote field elements by uppercase and indeterminates by lowercase
letters.
Definition 2.2. For a field extension Fqn |Fq of degree n > 1, the trace map is defined by
Tr : E(Fqn)→ E(Fq), P 7→ P + ϕ(P ) + . . .+ ϕn−1(P ).
When n is prime, the kernel of the trace map is called the trace zero subgroup of E(Fqn). We
denote it by Tn.
The trace zero subgroup is isomorphic to the group of Fq-rational points of the trace zero
variety Vn, which is an (n− 1)-dimensional subvariety of the Weil restriction of E: Fixing a basis
{ζ0, . . . , ζn−1} of Fqn |Fq, we have Vn(Fq) ∼= Tn via
(1) (X0, . . . , Xn−1, Y0, . . . , Yn−1) 7→ (X0ζ0 + . . .+Xn−1ζn−1, Y0ζ0 + . . .+ Yn−1ζn−1).
In this paper, we consider the case n ≥ 3, when the trace zero variety has dimension at least 2.
We study the hardness of the DLP in Tn, which is of interest in cryptography for various
reasons, as explained in the Introduction. In particular, the DLP in Tn is as hard as the DLP in
E(Fqn). This is shown for the analogous case of algebraic tori in [GV05], and more generally for
exact sequences of abelian varieties in [GS06]. The result as we state it here is Proposition 2.4
in [GM13].
Proposition 2.3. Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fq, and let Tn be the trace zero subgroup
of E(Fqn) for some prime number n. Then the sequence
0 −→ E(Fq) −→ E(Fqn) ϕ−id−→ Tn −→ 0
is exact, and the DLP in E(Fqn) has the same complexity as the DLP in Tn.
In [GM14] we wrote an equation for the x-coordinates of the points in Tn using the Semaev
polynomial. We briefly summarize how to write such an equation, starting with the definition and
the main result from [Sem04].
Definition 2.4. Let Fq be a finite field of characteristic at least 5, and let E be a smooth elliptic
curve defined over Fq by the affine equation
E : y2 = x3 +Ax+B.
The m-th summation polynomial or Semaev polynomial fn is defined recursively by
f3(z1, z2, z3) = (z1 − z2)2z23 − 2((z1 + z2)(z1z2 +A) + 2B)z3 + (z1z2 −A)2 − 4B(z1 + z2)
fm(z1, . . . , zm) = Resz(fm−k(z1, . . . , zm−k−1, z), fk+2(zm−k, . . . , zm, z))
for m ≥ 4 and m− 3 ≥ k ≥ 1, where Res denotes the resultant.
Theorem 2.5 ([Sem04], Theorem 1). For any m ≥ 3, let Z1, . . . , Zm be elements of the algebraic
closure Fq of Fq. Then fm(Z1, . . . , Zm) = 0 if and only if there exist Y1, . . . , Ym ∈ Fq such that
the points (Zi, Yi) are on E and (Z1, Y1) + . . .+ (Zm, Ym) = O in the group E(Fq). Furthermore,
fm is absolutely irreducible and symmetric of degree 2
m−2 in each variable. The total degree is
(m− 1)2m−2.
Remark 2.6. The original definition from [Sem04] is for elliptic curves defined over fields of
characteristic at least 5. However, polynomials with the same properties can be defined also for
characteristic 2 and 3. Therefore, all results of this paper hold, with the appropriate adjustments,
over finite fields of any characteristic.
The Semaev polynomial is used in [GM14] to give the following equation for the x-coordinates
of the points of Tn.
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Proposition 2.7 ([GM14, Proposition 3, Remark 5]). Let n be an odd prime, and let Tn be the
trace zero subgroup of E(Fqn). Then
Tn ⊆ {(X,Y ) ∈ E(Fqn) | fn(X,Xq, . . . , Xq
n−1
) = 0} ∪ {O}.
Moreover, we have
T3 = {(X,Y ) ∈ E(Fq3) | f3(X,Xq, Xq2) = 0} ∪ {O}
T5 ∪ (E[3](Fq) + (E[2] ∩ T5)) = {(X,Y ) ∈ E(Fq5) | f5(X,Xq, . . . , Xq4) = 0} ∪ {O}.
In the case when n = 3 or 5, for any root X ∈ Fqn of fn(x, xq , . . . , xqn−1) = 0 it can be decided
efficiently whether (X,Y ) ∈ Tn by checking Y ∈ Fqn and, if n = 5, by checking in addition that
X /∈ L := {XQ+R | Q+R = (XQ+R, YQ+R) ∈ E[3](Fq) + (E[2] ∩ T5), Q 6= O}, where |L| ≤ 16.
As discussed in [GM14] at the end of Section 3, Weil restriction of fn(x, x
q , . . . , xq
n−1
) = 0 with
respect to the coordinates
x = x0ζ0 + . . .+ xn−1ζn−1
y = y0ζ0 + . . .+ yn−1ζn−1
and reduction modulo the polynomials xqi − xi yield exactly one equation
(2) f˜n(x0, . . . , xn−1) = 0.
Its zeros describe the x-coordinates of the points of Vn(Fq) as given by Proposition 2.7 and via
the isomorphism (1). Therefore, we henceforth use (2) as an equation for the trace zero subgroup.
It has total degree (n− 1)2n−2.
3. An index calculus algorithm for the trace zero variety
Following the ideas of Gaudry [Gau09], we propose the following index calculus algorithm to
compute discrete logarithms in Tn. When n = 2, then Vn is one-dimensional, and the attack
cannot be applied. Therefore, we only consider n ≥ 3. Furthermore, we assume that Tn is cyclic,
which is the most relevant case in cryptography.
Remark 3.1. When Tn is not cyclic, some of the probability estimates in Section 4 may be wrong
and the algorithm may not function as expected. However, these problems can be overcome using
classical randomization techniques (see [Gau09, Remark 2], [EG02]).
The algorithm takes as input two points P,Q ∈ Tn such that Tn = 〈P 〉, and it outputs the
discrete logarithm logP Q, i.e. a number ℓ = logP Q ∈ Z/ ord(P )Z such that ℓP = Q in Tn. Below,
we describe the different steps of the algorithm in detail. We always identify Tn and Vn(Fq) via
the isomorphism (1).
3.1. Setup. Following the suggestion of Semaev [Sem04], we carry out the index calculus algo-
rithm working only with the x-coordinates of points in Tn. We choose a basis {ζ0, . . . , ζn−1} of
the extension Fqn |Fq and represent an affine point P = (X,Y ) ∈ Tn via the coordinates
P = (X0, . . . , Xn−1),
where X = X0ζ0 + X1ζ1 + . . . + Xn−1ζn−1. So by writing (X0, . . . , Xn−1) ∈ Tn we mean that
there exists a Y such that (X,Y ) ∈ Tn. We use (2) as an equation for Tn.
3.2. Factor base. We define the factor base
F = {(0, . . . , 0, Xn−2, Xn−1) ∈ Tn}.
These are the Fq-rational points of a curve C in Vn obtained by intersecting Vn with the hyperplanes
{x0 = 0}, . . . , {xn−3 = 0}. Since Vn has dimension n − 1, intersecting with n − 2 hyperplanes
generically gives a curve C. Thus F = C(Fq) has about q elements by the Theorem of Hasse–Weil,
provided that C is absolutely irreducible.
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Remark 3.2. Important properties of the factor base are that it has about q elements (this will
be used in the complexity analysis, see Section 4) and that its elements can be described via
algebraic equations (this will allow us to describe relations via a polynomial system, see Section
3.3). A further very important property is that the factor base must generate a large part of Tn,
so that many elements of Tn decompose over the factor base. For this reason, the curve C should
not be contained in any proper abelian subvariety of Vn. Notice that this can easily be detected
in practice, since the algorithm will find practically no relations when C is an abelian subvariety
of Vn.
Moreover, the fact that |F| ≈ q can be proven (with the Theorem of Hasse–Weil) only if we
assume that C is smooth and absolutely irreducible. In practice, if setting x0 = . . . = xn−3 = 0
does not produce a factor base with the desired properties, we simply make a different choice of
hyperplanes. In our exposition we assume that the choice we have made is a good one. This is
true in all our experiments.
Using equation (2), we see that any element (0, . . . , 0, Xn−2, Xn−1) ∈ F satisfies the equation
f˜n(0, . . . , 0, Xn−2, Xn−1) = 0. Conversely, the Fq-solutions (Xn−2, Xn−1) of
(3) f˜n(0, . . . , 0, xn−2, xn−1) = 0
yield x-coordinates of points in F via (Xn−2, Xn−1) 7→ Xn−2ζn−2 + Xn−1ζn−1, provided that
the corresponding y-coordinates are in Fqn and up to a few exceptions, as explained above (see
also Proposition 2.7). Therefore, enumerating the factor base essentially amounts to finding all
solutions of (3).
3.3. Relation collection. Since Vn has dimension n− 1, we search for relations of the form
(4) R = P0 + . . .+ Pn−2,
where R = αP + βQ ∈ Tn is given and P0, . . . , Pn−2 ∈ F are to be found. We write U =
U0ζ0 + U1ζ1 + . . .+ Un−1ζn−1 for the x-coordinate of R.
Following [Sem04], we use the Semaev polynomial to describe a relation. If the points P0, . . . ,
Pn−2 with x-coordinates XP0 , . . . , XPn−2 are given, then according to Theorem 2.5 they satisfy
(4) if and only if fn(XP0 , . . . , XPn−2 , U) = 0. Therefore, candidates for x-coordinates of the Pi can
be found by solving
(5) fn(xP0 , . . . , xPn−2 , U) = 0
for the xPi . We apply Weil restriction to equation (5) using the coordinates
xPi = xi,0ζ0 + xi,1ζ1 + . . .+ xi,n−1ζn−1
and obtain n equations
(6) Fj(x0,0, . . . , xn−2,n−1, U0, . . . , Un−1) = 0, j = 0, . . . , n− 1.
Solving this system over Fq is equivalent to solving equation (5) over Fqn , and yields possible
x-coordinates for the points Pi.
In addition to requiring that the Pi’s sum to R, we must ensure that they belong to the factor
base. Therefore, we set xi,0 = . . . = xi,n−3 = 0 for i = 0, . . . , n− 1, and we include an equation of
the form (3) in system (6) for each Pi. This means that in order to find a relation, we solve the
system
(7)
F0(0, . . . , 0, x0,n−2, x0,n−1, . . . , 0, . . . , 0, xn−2,n−2, xn−2,n−1, U0, . . . , Un−1) = 0
...
Fn−1(0, . . . , 0, x0,n−2, x0,n−1, . . . , 0, . . . , 0, xn−2,n−2, xn−2,n−1, U0, . . . , Un−1) = 0
f˜n(0, . . . , 0, x0,n−2, x0,n−1) = 0
...
f˜n(0, . . . , 0, xn−2,n−2, xn−2,n−1) = 0
over Fq. The system has 2n− 1 equations in 2(n− 1) indeterminates, two indeterminates for each
of the Pi’s. The first n equations are the Weil descent of the n-th Semaev polynomial, where a
constant has been plugged in for the last indeterminate. Therefore, they each have total degree
at most (n − 1)2n−2. They describe the condition that the points Pi sum to R. The last n − 1
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equations also have total degree at most (n− 1)2n−2. They guarantee that the solution points Pi
belong to the factor base.
Since the system has more equations than unknowns, one would expect that it generically has
no solutions over the algebraic closure and that, when it has solutions, then it is zero-dimensional.
This is verified in our experiments. Then, by the Shape Lemma (see e.g. [KR00, Theorem 3.7.25]),
the systemmay be solved by computing a lexicographic Gro¨bner basis and then finding the Fq-roots
of a univariate polynomial. Notice that, in order to find the Fq-roots of a polynomial f(x) ∈ Fq[x],
one would first find the divisor g(x) of f(x) which is the product of all linear factors of f(x) over
Fq, then factor g(x), whose degree equals the number of solutions of the system over Fq. Again,
this is the case only after a generic change of coordinates. In the examples we computed however,
a change of coordinates was never needed.
Whenever a given point R decomposes over the factor base, i.e. when a relation of the form (4)
exists, this gives a solution of system (7). The converse, however, is not true. For example, when
the solutions of the system give x-coordinates where one of the corresponding y-coordinates is not
in Fqn , then this does not produce a valid relation. In theory, it is also possible that a system
produces more than one relation. However, we expect this to be extremely rare, since it would
produce a relation among the elements of the factor base. In accordance with this intuition, we
never encountered a system with more than one solution in our experiments.
Remark 3.3. Joux and Vitse [JV12] propose considering relations that involve one factor base
point less than suggested by Gaudry, i.e. only n−2 points in our case. This reduces the probability
of finding relations by a factor q, but in some cases it can make the difference between a manageable
and an unmanageable system. We consider this idea in Section 5.2.
Finally, we need to produce more relations than there are factor base elements, i.e. about q,
by solving the system sufficiently many times (see Section 4 for an estimate) for different random
points R.
3.4. Linear algebra. The relation collection phase of the algorithm produces a sparse matrix of
size about q × q with entries 0 or 1. Notice that, while it is theoretically possible to have a row
whose entries are positive numbers greater than 1, this should be extremely rare and in fact we
never encountered such a relation in our experiments. The rows of the matrix correspond to the
factor base elements, and the columns correspond to the different relations. Generically a column
has n − 1 non-zero entries, one for each factor base element that appears in the corresponding
relation. Assuming that more relations have been produced than there are factor base elements,
the matrix has more columns than rows. Therefore, there exists a non-zero vector in its right
kernel. The task of the linear algebra step is to find such a vector, where the computations must
be performed not over Z, but modulo the order of P in Tn. Standard methods to solve such sparse
linear systems are Wiedemann’s Algorithm and Lanczos’ Algorithm (see [Wie86, LO90]).
Remark 3.4. Since there are efficient and well-studied methods for solving sparse linear systems,
we do not treat this step in detail. Notice however that the efficient implementation of the linear
algebra step is far from trivial, especially since the algorithms are hard to parallelize. One recent
record-breaking implementation on GPUs is presented in [Jel13, Jel14]. Moreover, in practice a
filtering step can make a big difference, see e.g. [Bou12]. This is a preprocessing of the matrix,
where duplicate relations are removed, points that appear in only one relation (corresponding to
rows with only one nonzero entry) are removed, and excess relations are removed until there are
exactly |F|+ 1 of them left. We do not employ such sophisticated techniques in our experiments,
since we treat only small examples and our emphasis is on finding relations and not on the linear
algebra step.
3.5. Individual logarithm. Once the linear system has been solved, computing the actual dis-
crete logarithm is easy. Denoting by (γ1, . . . , γr) the vector in the kernel of the matrix computed
in the previous step and by αj , βj the values of α, β corresponding to the j-th relation we have
logP Q = −

 r∑
j=1
γjαj



 r∑
j=1
γjβj


−1
,
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provided that
∑
γjβj is invertible modulo the order or P . If not, one must collect more relations in
order to produce a different matrix and find a different vector γ. Notice that
∑
γjβj is invertible
with high probability, especially if ord(P ) is prime.
4. Complexity analysis
We now analyze the complexity of the index calculus algorithm presented in the previous
section. We make the same heuristic assumptions as Gaudry [Gau09] and other work based on
Gaudry’s results, e.g. [GV05, JV12]. Our analysis is in q and n and therefore more precise than
that of Gaudry, who disregards the dependency on n. By disregarding the dependency on n in our
analysis, one obtains the result of Gaudry. For simplicity we use the O˜-notation, which ignores
logarithmic factors in both n and q.
4.1. Setup. Diem [Die11] shows that the n-th Semaev polynomial and its Weil restriction can be
computed with a randomized algorithm in expected time polynomial in O˜(en
2
).
Remark 4.1. We do not have to compute the full Weil restriction of fn(xi, x
q
i , . . . , x
qn−1
i ) or of
fn(xP0 , xP1 , . . . , xPn−2 , u), since we only need to evaluate the polynomials on the x-coordinates
of points in the factor base. Therefore, when computing the Weil restriction, we work with the
coordinates xPi = xi,n−2ζn−2 + xi,n−1ζn−1. In practice, this procedure is much quicker than
first computing the usual Weil restriction and then setting xi0 = . . . = xi,n−3 = 0, and the
complexity is lower than the one given in [Die11]. However, since this term will not dominate the
final complexity of the index calculus algorithm, the complexity estimate by Diem suffices for our
purposes.
We choose to treat u, the x-coordinate of R, as an indeterminate. Then we only have to compute
the Weil restriction once to obtain system (7). Each time we plug a value for the x-coordinate of
R into system (7), we obtain a system which possibly produces a relation.
4.2. Factor base. In order to enumerate the factor base, we go through all values Xn−2 ∈ Fq,
compute the solutions of f˜n(0, . . . , 0, Xn−2, xn−1) = 0 over Fq, and check whether the solution gives
a point in Tn. Since the degree of f˜n in xn−1 is bounded by (n− 1)2n−2, computing all solutions
takes O˜((n− 1)2n−2) operations in Fq (see [GvzG99, Corollary 14.16]). Typically, there are only
few solutions. Checking whether the y-coordinate corresponding to X = Xn−2ζn−2 +Xn−1ζn−1
is in Fqn is much cheaper. Altogether, enumerating the factor base costs
O˜(q(n− 1)2n−2).
4.3. Relation generation. Assuming that most different unordered (n−1)-tuples of factor base
elements sum to different points in Tn, then |F|n−1/(n − 1)! points of Tn decompose over the
factor base. Since Tn has about q
n−1 elements, this means that the probability of a point R ∈ Tn
splitting over the factor base is 1/(n− 1)!. Therefore, in order to generate q relations, we expect
to have to try to decompose q(n− 1)! points, i.e. solve q(n− 1)! systems.
In order to solve each system, we follow the approach that is most efficient in practice: We
first compute a Gro¨bner basis with respect to the degree reverse lexicographic term order, and we
then use a Gro¨bner walk algorithm to convert it to a lexicographic Gro¨bner basis. Afterwards, we
factor a univariate polynomial. The complexity of the last step is negligible compared to the first
two.
To estimate the complexity of the Gro¨bner basis computation, we use the bound on the com-
plexity of Fauge`re’s F5 algorithm [Fau02]. We assume that the system is semi-regular, which
is true generically. Then according to [BFSY05, Proposition 6], the complexity of computing a
degree reverse lexicographic Gro¨bner basis of our system is
O
((
dreg + 2n− 2
2n− 2
)ω)
,
where 2 ≤ ω ≤ 3 is the linear algebra constant (i.e. the exponent in the complexity of matrix
multiplication) and dreg is the degree of regularity of the system (this is also called the regularity
index, see [KR05, Definition 5.1.8]).
We estimate dreg using a standard bound from commutative algebra
dreg ≤ (2n− 2)((n− 1)2n−2 − 1) + 1 = (2n− 2)(n− 1)2n−2 − 2n+ 3.
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Hence the complexity of computing a degree reverse lexicographic Gro¨bner basis of our system is
O
((
(2n− 2)(n− 1)2n−2 + 1
2n− 2
)ω)
.
Now using the FGLM algorithm [FGLM93], we may compute from this basis a lexicographic
Gro¨bner basis in
O((2n− 2) ·D3),
where D is the degree of the ideal generated by the degree reverse lexicographic Gro¨bner basis
(i.e. the number of solutions counted with multiplicity in Fq). Using as a bound on D the product
of the degrees of 2n− 2 of the equations of the system, we get
D ≤ ((n− 1)2n−2)2n−2.
Therefore, this is not more expensive than F5.
Taking into account that we have to do this q(n − 1)! times, the total cost of the relation
collection step is
O
((
(2n− 2)(n− 1)2n−2 + 1
2n− 2
)ω
(n− 1)!q
)
.
4.4. Linear algebra. Using Lanczos’ or Wiedemann’s Algorithm, the cost of solving a sparse
linear system of size about q × q, where each column has n− 1 non-zero entries, is
O((n− 1)q2)
(see e.g. [EK97]).
4.5. Individual logarithm. The cost of computing the individual logarithm is negligible com-
pared to the complexities above.
Putting everything together, we get that the algorithm has a total complexity of
O˜
((
(2n− 2)(n− 1)2n−2 + 1
2n− 2
)ω
(n− 1)!q + (n− 1)q2
)
.
4.6. Double large prime variation. As suggested by Gaudry, we may use the double large
prime variation [The´03, GTTD07] in order to rebalance the complexity of the relation collection
and the linear algebra step in q. Then one must collect q2−2/(n−1) relations instead of q and
solve a linear system of size q1−1/(n−1) × q1−1/(n−1) instead of q × q. Then the overall cost of the
algorithm becomes
O˜
((
(2n− 2)(n− 1)2n−2 + 1
2n− 2
)ω
(n− 1)!q2−2/(n−1)
)
.
Hence we have proven the following heuristic result.
Theorem 4.2. Let Tn, n ≥ 3, be the trace zero subgroup of an elliptic curve. Then there exists a
probabilistic algorithm that computes discrete logarithms in Tn in heuristic time
O˜
((
(2n− 2)(n− 1)2n−2 + 1
2n− 2
)ω
(n− 1)!q2−2/(n−1)
)
where n is constant and q tends to infinity. The constant in the O˜ does not depend on q or n.
The heuristic nature of Theorem 4.2 is due to the following heuristic assumptions, which are
standard assumptions in this context, see e.g. [Gau09]. First of all, we assume that (after a
randomization of coordinates) there is a choice of hyperplanes which, upon intersection with Vn,
produce an absolutely irreducible smooth curve in Vn, whose Fq-rational points define a factor
base of cardinality about q (see Remark 3.2), and so that the sums of n − 1 factor base points
produce about qn−1/(n−1)! different elements of Vn(Fq). Secondly, we assume that the systems to
be solved are either empty or zero-dimensional, and semi-regular. Finally, we assume that (after
a randomization of coordinates), Tn is cyclic, as explained in Remark 3.1.
10 ELISA GORLA AND MAIKE MASSIERER
Remark 4.3. In particular, q must be sufficiently large compared to n. More precisely, we need
that
qn−1 > (n− 1)!q2(1−1/(n−1))(1−2/(n−1)).
This is due to the fact that we need to be able to find enough relations: Taking into account
the double large prime variation, we need to produce q2−2/(n−1) relations, and the probability
of finding a relation is 1/((n − 1)!q1−2/(n−1)). Therefore we expect to have to try to decompose
about (n− 1)!q2(1−1/(n−1))(1−2/(n−1)) points, hence Tn must have at least that many points.
If we allow the constant in the O˜ to depend on n but not on q, Theorem 4.2 gives the heuristic
complexity of O˜(q2−2/(n−1)) from [Gau09]. Our analysis makes the exponential dependency on n
explicit. The exponential dependency of the complexity on n was already pointed out by Gaudry
and is due to the cost of the Gro¨bner basis computation. Notice that one cannot hope to get
subexponential complexity in n for generic systems, due to the complexity bound for F5, which
is exponential in n in our situation.
5. Explicit equations and experiments
We now study the systems of polynomial equations that describe the relations and the over-
all behavior of our algorithm for n = 3, 5. All computations were done with Magma version
2.19.3 [BCP97] on one core of an Intel Xeon X7550 Processor (2.00 GHz) on a Fujitsu Primergy
RX900S1. Our implementation is only meant to be a proof of concept. It is a straightforward
implementation of the algorithm described in Section 3, and we use the built-in Magma routines
wherever possible, e.g. for Gro¨bner basis computation, polynomial factorization, and linear alge-
bra. Our timings are only meant as an indication, and they could be improved significantly by
a special-purpose implementation, using current state-of-the-art methods such as [BBD+14], and
by choosing convenient parameters, such as finite fields where particularly efficient arithmetic is
possible. We concentrate mostly on the computation of the equations of the trace zero subgroup,
the factor base, and the relation generation. In particular, we did not implement any filtering (ex-
cept for not allowing duplicate relations), we did not implement the double large prime variation,
and our implementation is not parallelized.
5.1. Explicit equations for n = 3. When n = 3, the trace zero variety has dimension 2.
Therefore, the index calculus attack on T3 is not more efficient than generic (square root) attacks
on T3. Since n = 3 is the case where all equations are small enough to be written down explicitly,
we present them nevertheless, together with some experimental data that allows us to make
predictions on the feasibility of this attack for different values of q.
For simplicity, we assume that 3 | q− 1 and write Fq3 = Fq[ζ]/(ζ3 −µ) as a Kummer extension
of Fq with basis 1, ζ, ζ
2. For cases where this is not possible, one may use a normal basis, which
gives similar equations. We also assume that Fq does not have characteristic 2 or 3 and that E is
given by an equation in short Weierstraß form
E : y2 = x3 +Ax+B.
Our approach also works when Fq has characteristic 2 or 3, but in this case the definition of the
Semaev polynomial and all equations given below must be adjusted (see Remark 2.6).
The third Semaev polynomial is
f3(z1, z2, z3) = (z1 − z2)2z23 − 2((z1 + z2)(z1z2 +A) + 2B)z3 + (z1z2 −A)2 − 4B(z1 + z2),
and the Weil restriction of f3(x, x
q, xq
2
) is
f˜3(x0, x1, x2) = −3x40 − 12µ2x0x32 − 12µx0x31 + 18µx20x1x2
+9µ2x21x
2
2 − 6Ax20 + 6Aµx1x2 − 12Bx0 +A2.
We write points of T3 as tuples (X0, X1, X2) that satisfy f˜3(X0, X1, X2) = 0. For the factor base,
we choose those points with X0 = 0, namely
F = {(0, X1, X2) ∈ T3}.
These are precisely the points in T3 that satisfy
(8) f˜3(0, X1, X2) = 9µ
2X21X
2
2 + 6AµX1X2 +A
2 = (3µX1X2 +A)
2 = 0.
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If A = 0, then this is equivalent to
X1X2 = 0,
and it is particularly easy to enumerate the factor base: One simply checks which x-coordinates
(0, X1, 0) and (0, 0, X2), for X1, X2 ∈ Fq, give points in T3. If, on the other hand, A 6= 0, then
every solution of (8) satisfies X1 6= 0, and moreover (8) is equivalent to
(9) X2 = − A
3µX1
.
In this case, it is also fairly easy to enumerate the factor base: For every X1 ∈ F∗q , one computes
X2 according to (9) and checks whether this yields a point of T3.
Now we need to find relations of the form
R = P0 + P1,
where R with x-coordinate U = U0+U1ζ+U2ζ
2 is given and P1, P2 are in F . We denote by xP0 =
x01ζ + x02ζ
2 the indeterminates representing the x-coordinate of P0 and by xP1 = x11ζ + x12ζ
2
those representing the x-coordinate of P1. Then we have to solve
f3(xP0 , xP1 , U) = 0,
or equivalently, its Weil restriction. Assuming that A 6= 0, which is the general case, from (9) we
get
x02 = − A
3µx01
and x12 = − A
3µx11
.
Plugging this into the above system and multiplying the first two equations by 27µx201x
2
11 and the
third equation by 81µ2x201x
2
11 allows us to eliminate the two indeterminates x02 and x12 from the
system that describes a relation. We obtain
(10)
0 = 36x01
3x11µ
2AU1U2 + 36x01x11
3µ2AU1U2 − 72x01
2x11
2µ2AU1U2
−12x01x11A
2U0U2µ+ 54x01
4x11
2µ2U0U1 + 54x01
2x11
4µ2U0U1
−18x01
3x11
2µ2AU2 − 18x01
2x11
3µ2AU2 − 108x01
3x11
3µ2U0U1
+18x01x11
4µ2AU2 + 18x01
4x11µ
2AU2 + 6x01
2A2U0U2µ+ 6x11
2A2U0U2µ
−108x01
2x11
2BU0µ− 36x01
2x11
2AU0
2µ+ 6x01
2x11A
2U1µ+ 6x01x11
2A2U1µ
+18x01
3x11AU0
2µ− 6x01x11A
2U1
2µ+ 18x01x11
3AU0
2µ+ 3x11
4A2µ
+3x01
4A2µ− 54x01
4x11
3µ2U0 − 54x01
3x11
4µ2U0 − 54x01
3x11
3µ3U2
2
+27x01
2x11
4µ3U2
2 + 27x01
4x11
2µ3U2
2 + 18x01x11
3A2µ+ 18x01
3x11A
2µ
+39x01
2x11
2A2µ+ 3x11
2A2U1
2µ+ 3x01
2A2U1
2µ− 6x01
3A2U1µ
−6x11
3A2U1µ+ 2x01A
3U0 + 2x11A
3U0
0 = −72x01
2x11
2AU0U1µ+ 36x01x11
3AU0U1µ− 12x01x11A
2U1U2µ
+36x01
3x11AU0U1µ− 6x01x11A
3 + 3x01
2A2U0
2 + 2x11A
3U1 + 2x01A
3U1
+3x11
2A2U0
2 − 54x01
3x11
4µ2U1 + 27x01
2x11
4µ2U1
2 + 27x01
4x11
2µ2U1
2
−54x01
3x11
3µ2U1
2 − 54x01
4x11
3µ2U1 − 6x11
3A2U2µ− 6x01
3A2U2µ
−108x01
2x11
3Bµ− 108x01
3x11
2Bµ− 2x11
2A3 + 27x01
4x11
4µ2 − 2x01
2A3
−6x01x11A
2U0
2 + 54x01
2x11
4µ2U0U2 + 54x01
4x11
2µ2U0U2
−108x01
3x11
3µ2U0U2 − 36x01
2x11
2µ2AU2
2 + 18x01x11
3µ2AU2
2
+18x01
3x11µ
2AU2
2 − 18x01
3x11
2AU0µ− 18x01
2x11
3AU0µ+ 6x01x11
2A2U2µ
+6x01
2x11A
2U2µ− 108x01
2x11
2BU1µ+ 18x01x11
4AU0µ+ 18x01
4x11AU0µ
+6x01
2A2U1U2µ+ 6x11
2A2U1U2µ
0 = −216x01
2x11
2AU0U2µ
2 + 108x01x11
3AU0U2µ
2 + 108x01
3x11AU0U2µ
2
+18x11
2A2U0U1µ+ 18x01
2A2U0U1µ+ 18x01
2x11A
2U0µ+ 108x01x11
2BAµ
+18x01x11
2A2U0µ+ 108x01
2x11BAµ− 36x01x11A
2U0U1µ− 162x01
4x11
3µ3U2
−162x01
3x11
4µ3U2 + 9x11
2A2U2
2µ2 + 9x01
2A2U2
2µ2 − 162x01
3x11
3Aµ2
+81x01
2x11
4U0
2µ2 − 54x01
2x11
4Aµ2 + 81x01
4x11
2U0
2µ2 − 162x01
3x11
3U0
2µ2
−54x01
4x11
2Aµ2 + A4 − 324x01
2x11
2BU2µ
2 + 54x01
4x11AU1µ
2
+54x01
3x11AU1
2µ2 − 18x01x11A
2U2
2µ2 + 54x01x11
4AU1µ
2 + 54x01x11
3AU1
2µ2
−54x01
3x11
2AU1µ
2 − 54x01
2x11
3AU1µ
2 − 108x01
2x11
2AU1
2µ2
+162x01
4x11
2µ3U1U2 − 324x01
3x11
3µ3U1U2 + 162x01
2x11
4µ3U1U2
−18x11
3A2U0µ+ 6x11A
3U2µ− 18x01
3A2U0µ+ 6x01A
3U2µ.
This system only involves the two indeterminates x01, x11. All equations have degree 4 in both
x01 and x11. The first and third equations have total degree 7, and the second equation has
total degree 8. We have computed that the system (10) has regularity 14 for almost all points R
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(and regularity 12 or 13 for some special choices of R). This means that the highest degree of
all polynomials appearing during the Gro¨bner basis computation is at most 14. This moderate
number suggests that the Gro¨bner basis computation is not very costly, and our experiments (see
below) show that this is indeed true.
For a given x-coordinate U of a point R ∈ Tn, the Fq-solutions (X01, X11) of the above system
with X01, X11 6= 0 give candidates for x-coordinates
X0 = X01ζ − A
3µX01
ζ2 and X1 = X11ζ − A
3µX11
ζ2
of the points P0, P1 in the relation.
Example 5.1. We give a toy example. Let q = 212−3,Fq3 = Fq/(ζ3−2), and E : y2 = x3+x+21.
Then T3 has order 16715869, which is a 24-bit prime, and we take
P = 3961 + 199ζ + 4028ζ2
as a generator. We choose a random
Q = 3342 + 3020ζ + 4031ζ2,
of which we wish to compute the discrete logarithm. The elements of the factor base satisfy
6xi1xi2 + 1 = 0, i = 0, 1,
and we compute that there are exactly 4002 such points. Now we choose random α = 4297188
and β = 10382682, which gives U = 2960 + 1129ζ + 1917ζ2, and we solve the system
0 = 439x401x
3
11 + 1215x
4
01x
2
11 + 2556x
4
01x11 + 2274x
4
01 + 439x
3
01x
4
11 + 1663x
3
01x
3
11
+1537x301x
2
11 + 3403x
3
01x11 + 2023x
3
01 + 1215x
2
01x
4
11 + 1537x
2
01x
3
11 + 1961x
2
01x
2
11
+2070x201x11 + 2326x
2
01 + 2556x01x
4
11 + 3403x01x
3
11 + 2070x01x
2
11 + 3534x01x11
+716x01 + 2274x
4
11 + 2023x
3
11 + 2326x
2
11 + 716x11
0 = 2x401x
4
11 + 3670x
4
01x
3
11 + 938x
4
01x
2
11 + 609x
4
01x11 + 3670x
3
01x
4
11 + 2217x
3
01x
3
11
+3400x301x
2
11 + 405x
3
01x11 + 3667x
3
01 + 938x
2
01x
4
11 + 3400x
2
01x
3
11 + 2586x
2
01x
2
11
+426x201x11 + 94x
2
01 + 609x01x
4
11 + 405x01x
3
11 + 426x01x
2
11 + 115x01x11
+345x01 + 3667x
3
11 + 94x
2
11 + 345x11
0 = 518x401x
3
11 + 1692x
4
01x
2
11 + 2117x
4
01x11 + 518x
3
01x
4
11 + 2070x
3
01x
3
11 + 1976x
3
01x
2
11
+1677x301x11 + 1945x
3
01 + 1692x
2
01x
4
11 + 1976x
2
01x
3
11 + 3431x
2
01x
2
11 + 2162x
2
01x11
+1057x201 + 2117x01x
4
11 + 1677x01x
3
11 + 2162x01x
2
11 + 1979x01x11 + 71x01
+1945x311 + 1057x
2
11 + 71x11 + 3474.
We get X01 = 1770, X11 = 1515, and from these we compute X02 = 338, X12 = 3029, which gives
a relation
P0 + P1 = R
for some choice of y-coordinates. After collecting 4002 more such relations and solving the linear
system, we obtain logP Q = 419.
Finally, we present implementation results for fields of different size in Table 1. For primes q of
10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, and 80 bits, we chose the smallest possible value µ, and we
chose curves E, given by the coefficients A,B, that yield cyclic trace zero subgroups T3 of prime
order. Where we were able to compute it, we list the exact size of the factor base. In all cases,
it is close to q − q1/2. We also list the number of points R we had to try in order to find |F|+ 1
distinct relations.
Times are given in seconds, and numbers in normal font stand for computations that we were
able to perform, while numbers in bold represent expected times, extrapolated from timings we
were able to obtain. For example, when we are able to compute one relation, this allows us to
predict the time it would take to collect q relations (experimentally this requires solving about 2q
polynomial systems). Where we were not able to carry out a computation or make a prediction,
we write “–”.
For all field sizes, we were able to solve the system at least a few times. For comparison, we give
the time taken to compute a lexicographic Gro¨bner basis of the straightforward system consisting
of 5 equations in 4 indeterminates (“large system”), as well as the time taken to compute a
lexicographic Gro¨bner basis of system (10) consisting of 3 equations in 2 indeterminates (“small
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Table 1. Index calculus algorithm for n = 3, timings in seconds
log2 |T3| 20 24 28 32 36 40
q 210 − 3 212 − 3 214 − 3 216 − 15 218 − 93 220 − 3
µ 5 2 2 2 2 2
A 2 1 1 1 1 1
B 0 21 11 5 10 25
|F| 900 4002 16380 65388 261822 1045962
number of R’s tried 2208 8263 32828 130533 522935 2091965
time for GB of large system 0.01773 0.01698 0.01705 0.01792 0.01686 0.01703
time for GB of small system 0.00102 0.00169 0.00167 0.00124 0.00146 0.00135
time to solve small system 0.00115 0.00180 0.00173 0.00134 0.00159 0.00136
time to enumerate F 0.07 0.28 1.15 5.24 23.59 104.86
time to collect relations 3.52 13.53 49.71 197.17 803.95 2845.01
time linear algebra 0.01 0.30 5.22 108.29 129.69 –
total time 3.60 14.25 56.08 310.70 957.23 –
log2 |T3| 60 80 100 120 140 160
q 230 − 105 240 − 87 250 − 51 260 − 93 270 − 267 279 − 67
µ 2 2 2 2 5 3
A 1 1 1 1 1 1
B 24 49 40 193 15 368
|F| 230 240 250 260 270 279
number of R’s tried 231 241 251 261 271 280
time for GB of large system 0.02683 0.12645 0.12817 0.13431 0.15000 0.14102
time for GB of small system 0.00146 0.00231 0.00244 0.00249 0.00304 0.00262
time to solve small system 0.00171 0.00291 0.00342 0.00351 0.00467 0.00442
time to enumerate F 217.2 228.3 238.5 248.7 259.4 268.4
time to collect relations 221.8 232.5 242.8 252.8 263.2 272.1
system”). This shows that this little trick to simplify the system saves a considerable amount of
time in practice. Therefore, in the following, we work with the small system.
Next we list in the table the average time taken to solve the small system once. This includes
computing the lexicographic Gro¨bner basis, factoring a univariate polynomial (of degree 6 in
our experiments), which gives the value(s) of one indeterminate, and computing the correspond-
ing value(s) of the other indeterminate. For the Gro¨bner basis computation, we use Magma’s
GroebnerBasis(), which computes a degree reverse lexicographic Gro¨bner basis using Fauge`re’s
F4 algorithm [Fau99] and subsequently a lexicographic Gro¨bner basis using the FGLM algorithm
[FGLM93].
Finally, we give the actual or extrapolated times for the full execution of the different steps
of our algorithm. First we give the time to enumerate the factor base, then the time to collect
|F| + 1 relations, and then the time to solve the linear system, using the sparse linear algebra
routine ModularSolution(Lanczos:=true) of Magma, which is an implementation of Lanczos’
algorithm. We also give the total time to compute one discrete logarithm with our algorithm.
We see that the largest trace zero subgroup where we can compute a full discrete logarithm with
our prototype implementation has 36-bit size. The attack takes approximately 15 minutes. For
the 40-bit trace zero subgroup, we can compute sufficiently many relations in about 47 minutes,
but we are not able to solve the linear system of size about 220 × 220 in Magma. A specialized
implementation presented in [BBD+14, Jel13, Jel14] solves a linear system of size about 222× 222
in less than 5 days using a sophisticated implementation of Lanczos’ algorithm, running on a high
performance computer. This means that our attack is certainly feasible for a 40-bit trace zero
subgroup. However, we can do much better by rebalancing the cost of relation collection and
linear algebra.
Let us consider e.g. the group T3 of 60 bits, with q ≈ 230, as given in Table 1. We rebalance the
complexity with a relatively straightforward approach. Using a factor base of qr = 230r elements,
where 0 < r < 1, the probability of finding a relation becomes q2r−2/2. Hence in order to find qr
relations, we need to solve 2q2−r = 261−30r systems. Since we know that solving a linear system
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of size 222 × 222 is possible, we set qr = 222 and get r = 0.73. This means that we would have to
collect 239 relations, which would take 239.8 seconds or about 30 years. Assuming that solving a
linear system of size 223×223 is possible, we would need about 15 years to collect relations, etc. We
stress that these predictions correspond to the time required by our simple implementation. With
an optimized and parallel implementation of the relation collection step (notice that the relation
search can trivially be parallelized), it would become faster by a considerable factor. Hence we
conclude that with an optimized implementation, computing a discrete logarithm in a 60-bit trace
zero subgroup with this index calculus algorithm is feasible.
5.2. Explicit equations for n = 5. We proceed simliarly for n = 5, but we do not write down
the equations in this case because they are too large. We assume that 5 | q − 1 and write
Fq5 = Fq(ζ)/(ζ
5 − µ). Then 1, ζ, ζ2, ζ3, ζ4 is a basis of Fq5 |Fq, which we use for Weil restriction.
The fifth Semaev polynomial f5 has total degree 32. The same is true for f˜5(x0, . . . , x4), which
we use as an equation for T5. The factor base is
F = {(0, 0, 0, X3, X4) ∈ T5},
and all its elements satisfy the equation
(11) f˜5(0, 0, 0, x3, x4) = 0.
It has total degree 32 and degree 30 in each x3 and x4. Although this polynomial does not have
such a simple shape as the corresponding one for n = 3, it is still easy to enumerate the factor
base: For every X3 ∈ Fq, solve f˜5(0, 0, 0, X3, x4) = 0 for x4 in Fq.
Following an idea of Joux and Vitse [JV12] (see Remark 3.3), we look for relations of the form
(12) R = P0 + P1 + P2,
where P0, P1, P2 are elements of the factor base. We obtain a system of 8 equations in 6 indetermi-
nates: The first 5 equations are the Weil restriction of f4(xP0 , xP1 , xP2 , U) and correspond to (12).
They have total degree 12 and degree 4 in each indeterminate. The last 3 equations correspond
to the condition that the points belong to the factor base and are of the form (11). For a given
U , we solve this system in order to obtain possible relations. However, the system is too large to
be solved with Magma. Even over the relatively small field F1021, our computation did not finish
after several weeks of computation and using more than 300 GB of memory.
Hence we use a hybrid approach along the lines of [YCC04, BFP08]. This allows us to find
some relations, but it is not fast enough for an attack of realistic cryptographic size. Nevertheless,
we give some experimental results, timings, and extrapolations. The hybrid method is often used
where a direct Gro¨bner basis computation is too costly, since it is a trade-off between exhaustive
search and Gro¨bner basis techniques. The main idea is to choose fixed values for a small number of
variables and to solve the system in the remaining indeterminates. In order to find all solutions of
the system, all choices for the fixed variables have to be tried. Therefore, this requires computing
many Gro¨bner bases of smaller systems instead of computing one Gro¨bner basis of a large system.
In our case, it is enough to choose one fixed value in order to solve the system readily. We fix
x03 = X03 ∈ Fq and use the factor base equation f˜5(0, 0, 0, X03, x04) = 0 to determine possible
values of x04. Although this equation has degree 30 in x04, there are usually only very few
solutions, most frequently 1, 2, or 3. In every case where x04 = X04 gives a point in the factor
base, we plug x03 = X03 and x04 = X04 into the system to obtain a new system of 7 equations
in the 4 indeterminates x13, x14, x23, x24. The first five equations each have total degree 8 and
degree 4 in every indeterminate. By trying all X03 ∈ Fq, we find out whether R decomposes over
the factor base.
We give some timings and extrapolations in Table 2. As before, numbers in normal font are
times we measured, and numbers in bold are predictions. After giving the parameters of the fields
and curves we used, we indicate the number of points R which we tried to decompose (we expect
6q), the total number of polynomial systems to be solved for this (we expect 6q2), the time for
the solution of one system (this is equal to the time for computing a Gro¨bner basis, since the rest
of the computation to solve the system is negligible), the time to enumerate the factor base, the
time to collect about q relations, the time for the linear algebra step, and the time for the total
attack.
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Table 2. Index calculus algorithm for n = 5, timings in seconds
log2 |T5| 20 22 27 32 36 40
q 25 − 1 26 − 23 27 − 27 28 − 15 29 − 21 210 − 3
µ 2 2 2 3 2 2
A 1 1 1 1 1 1
B 16 3 3 13 18 1
|F| 40 70 110 230 520 970
number of R’s tried 886 884 2424 5784 11784 24528
number of systems solved 17719 30934 244824 1393944 5785944 25043088
time for GB of one system 1.30 1.31 1.28 1.21 1.22 1.32
time to enumerate F 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.18 0.43 0.89
time to collect relations 25004 38219 171085 821328 3818016 15084720
time linear algebra 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
total time 25164 43618 171085 821328 3818016 15084720
log2 |T5| 60 80 100 120 140 160
q 215 − 157 220 − 5 225 − 61 230 − 173 235 − 547 240 − 195
µ 3 2 2 2 5 2
A 1 1 1 1 1 1
B 7 10 17 5 3 12
|F| 32600 1051440 225 230 235 240
number of R’s tried 220 225 230 235 240 245
number of systems solved 235 245 255 265 275 285
time for GB of one system 1.34 1.33 7.09 6.93 146.16 147.89
time to enumerate F 38.80 1530.91 217.1 222.9 228.7 234.0
time to collect relations 234.3 245.4 257.8 267.7 282.2 292.2
time linear algebra 89.12 – – – – –
total time 234.3 245.4 257.8 267.7 282.2 292.2
The numbers show that we are able to compute a discrete logarithm in the 27-bit group T5
in about 2 days and that a discrete logarithm in the 32-bit, 36-bit, and 40-bit groups T5 can be
computed in about 10, 44, and 165 days, respectively. Clearly, this approach is far from feasible
for any group of cryptographic size.
We see that it is very costly to find a relation with this approach, for two reasons. Firstly, we
are searching for relations that involve only 3 points of the factor base. While the probability that
a point decomposes into a sum of 4 points of the factor base is 1/4! = 1/24, the probability that
it decomposes into a sum of 3 points of the factor base is 1/(3!q) = 1/(6q) (see Section 4). This
means that we expect to have to try about 6q points R in order to find one that decomposes.
Notice that we can still hope to find enough relations, even though the probability of finding a
relation has decreased by a factor q (Joux and Vitse [JV12] have shown that such an approach
is indeed advantageous in certain situations): Assuming that most distinct unordered 3-tuples
of factor base elements sum to distinct points of T5, this means that about q
3/6 points R ∈ T5
decompose into a sum of 3 factor base elements. This number is much larger than q. Therefore,
it is a realistic assumption that we find about q relations.
Secondly, every time we wish to check whether a given point R decomposes into a sum of 3
factor base points, we do not have to solve one system, but O(q) systems, namely a small number
of systems for every X03 ∈ Fq. In practice, not all X03 yield valid X04, therefore the number of
systems to be solved is actually smaller.
6. Comparison with other attacks and discussion
We now compare the index calculus attack on the DLP in Tn with other known attacks.
6.1. Pollard–Rho. Assuming that Tn is cyclic of prime order, the Pollard–Rho Algorithm per-
forms O(q(n−1)/2) steps, and each step consists essentially of a point addition and hence has
complexity O˜(1). Comparing this to the complexity of the index calculus algorithm in q, which is
O˜(q2−2/(n−1)), we see that the index calculus algorithm has smaller complexity for n ≥ 5. More
16 ELISA GORLA AND MAIKE MASSIERER
precisely, when n = 3 then Pollard–Rho and index calculus have the same complexity, when n = 5
the advantage of the index calculus attack comes only from the large prime variation (because
without the large prime variation, index calculus has complexity O˜(q2)), and when n > 5, the
index calculus method always has lower complexity, independently of the large prime trick. The
larger n, the larger the advantage of the index calculus algorithm over Pollard–Rho in this analysis.
However, the Pollard–Rho Algorithm has to perform only an elliptic curve point addition in
each step, while the index calculus algorithm has to compute a Gro¨bner basis, which is much
more expensive. Even in the case n = 3, where the system is much more manageable than for
larger n, we can solve less than a thousand systems per second (cf. Table 1), whereas elliptic
curve point addition can be performed at a rate of 25000 to 150000 per second (depending on
the size of the field; we measured this by adding random points of T3 in Magma, an optimized
implementation can achieve much better values). For larger values of n, the difference becomes
much more extreme, since the cost of elliptic curve point addition increases only at the same
rate as that of finite field arithmetic in Fqn , whereas the cost of the Gro¨bner basis computation
increases considerably. In fact the degree of the equations grows exponentially and the number of
equations and variables grows linearly in n. This is reflected in the large complexity in n of the
index calculus algorithm (see Theorem 4.2).
We conclude that in practice index calculus can be more efficient than Pollard–Rho only for
moderate values of n > 3 and very large values of q. We do not know the precise crossover point.
Notice also that the variant of the index calculus algorithm for T5 that uses the trick of Joux
and Vitse and the hybrid approach has complexity O˜(q3) in q, therefore it is not better than the
Pollard–Rho Algorithm for n = 5. It would be better only for n > 5.
6.2. Index calculus on the whole curve. The index calculus algorithm of Gaudry may also be
used to compute discrete logarithms in E(Fqn) by working in the n-dimensional Weil restriction of
E with respect to Fqn |Fq. This is one of the original applications suggested by Gaudry in [Gau09].
From a complexity theoretic point of view, it does not make sense to attack the DLP in E(Fqn)
when one wants to solve a DLP in Tn, since the complexity of Gaudry’s algorithm in q depends
on the dimension of the variety and therefore has complexity O˜(q2−2/n) in E(Fqn) and complexity
O˜(q2−2/(n−1)) in Tn.
From a practical point of view, however, the systems one gets when performing index calculus
on the whole curve may be more manageable, since they consist only of the Weil restriction of
the Semaev polynomial, whereas in our approach, the system contains also the equations of the
factor base. Moreover, when working in the whole curve, the Semaev polynomial may easily be
symmetrized, which gives a system of smaller degree and with fewer solutions, whereas it is not
obvious how to do this in our case. Also, when working in the whole curve, factor base elements
may be represented by one Fq-coordinate only, where we need two for the trace zero variety.
Therefore, our system has twice as many indeterminates. On the other hand, the advantage of
working in the trace zero variety is that relations contain n−1 factor base elements, and therefore
one uses fn to describe relations, whereas when working on the whole curve, relations contain n
factor base elements, thus one has to use fn+1. Summarizing, when working on the whole curve,
one has a system of n equations in n indeterminates of total degree 2n−1. In contrast, when
working in the trace zero variety one has a system of 2n− 1 equations in 2n − 2 indeterminates
of total degree (n− 1)2n−2.
Such subtleties are not evident in the original complexity analysis of Gaudry, which is only in
q (and n is taken to be constant) and where the Gro¨bner basis computation thus has constant
complexity. When performing an analysis similar to the one of Section 4 for Gaudry’s algorithm
on the whole curve, one obtains
O˜
((
n2n−1 + 1
n
)ω
n!q2−2/n
)
,
which is smaller in n. Therefore, which attack performs better depends on the relation between q
and n.
In both cases the feasibility of the Gro¨bner basis computation plays an important role in
practice.
INDEX CALCULUS IN THE TRACE ZERO VARIETY 17
6.3. Cover attacks. Cover attacks, also referred to as transfer attacks, were first proposed by
Frey [Fre99] and further studied by many authors, including Galbraith and Smart [GS99], Gaudry,
Hess, and Smart [GHS02], and Diem [Die03]. The aim of such attacks is to transfer the DLP
from the algebraic variety one is considering to the Picard group of a curve of larger (but still
rather low) genus, where the DLP is then solved using index calculus methods. There exist
different constructions, each of them specific to a certain type of curve or variety, and there are
constructions for cover attacks on E(Fqn) and on Tn directly.
For example, combining the results of [Die03] and [DK13], it is sometimes possible to map the
DLP to the Picard group of a genus 5 curve (which is usually not hyperelliptic), where it can be
solved in O˜(q4/3) . This is better than Gaudry’s index calculus in E(Fq5), which has complexity
O˜(q8/5), and the index calculus attack on T5, which has complexity O˜(q
3/2). However, the index
calculus attack on T5 applies to all curves, whereas only a very small proportion of curves is
affected by the cover attack.
Diem and Scholten [DS, DS03] propose a cover attack for the trace zero variety directly. It
works best for trace zero varieties of genus 2 curves, but it also applies to some trace zero varieties
of elliptic curves. Namely, when g = 1 and n = 5, the DLP may sometimes be transferred to a
curve of genus 4, where it can be solved in O˜(q4/3). Again, this is better than the complexity
of the index calculus attack, but it only affects a small number of curves (in fact, in [DS03] the
authors find only one curve vulnerable to this attack). The same is true for g = 1 and n = 7,
where the DLP may sometimes be mapped to a curve of genus 8 (in this case the authors cannot
find any examples, although they can prove that vulnerable curves exist).
7. Conclusions on the hardness of the DLP
We conclude that applying Gaudry’s index calculus algorithm for abelian varieties to the trace
zero variety, as presented in this paper, yields an attack in Tn that has smaller complexity than
generic algorithms whenever n ≥ 5 when the complexity is measured asymptotically in q. Although
there sometimes exist cover attacks with even better complexity, the index calculus attack can
be applied to trace zero varieties of all elliptic curves, while cover attacks apply only to a small
proportion of curves.
Since the DLP in Tn has the same complexity as the DLP in E(Fqn), we get that the DLP in
E(Fqn) may be attacked in complexity O˜(q
2−2/(n−1)) when E is defined over Fq. This is better
than all known direct attacks on the DLP in E(Fqn) for n ≥ 5.
For general n, we have seen that the complexity of our index calculus attack on Tn depends
exponentially on n and that it becomes infeasible for rather small values of n. This is due to
the fact that the algorithm has to solve many polynomial systems, whose size (i.e. number of
equations, number of indeterminates, degrees of the equations) depends on n, and that a Gro¨bner
basis computation quickly becomes unmanageable. In fact, already for n = 5 we cannot solve
the system with standard Gro¨bner basis software. By using some tricks (namely, considering
relations that involve one point less, using a hybrid approach), we were nevertheless able to produce
relations. However this does not yield a practical attack, since it multiplies the complexity of the
relation search by a factor q2.
Specialized Gro¨bner basis techniques in the spirit of [JV11, FPPR12, PQ12] would be needed
in order to efficiently solve the systems that arise in this index calculus attack, and more research
needs to be done on this topic in order to make our index calculus attack feasible in practice.
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